Abstract
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to connect several models of concurrency, by providing translations between them and studying which notions of behavioural equivalence these translations preserve.
In NIELSEN, PLOTKIN & WINSKEL [lS] event structures were introduced as a stepping stone between Petri nets and Scott domains. It was established that every safe Petri net can be unfolded into an occurrence net; the occurrence nets are then in correspondence with event structures; and they in turn correspond bi- The present paper configuration structures to unsafe nets. For this purpose we use a more general kind of configuration structure, the set systems. These have an attractive alternative presentation as propositional theories. As event structures are insufficiently expressive, they are skipped as an intermediate step in the translation. In the full version of this paper they will be generalised to match all configuration structures. The connection between configuration structures and Scott domains is generalised in VAN GLABBEEK [4] , where history preserving process graphs are considered as an alternative presentation of (labelled) domains.
Configuration structures A set system is given by a set E and a collection C of subsets of E. When a set system is used to represent a concurrent system, we call it a configuratzon structure. The elements of E are then events and the elements of C configuratzons. An event represents an occurrence of an action the system may perform; a configuration X represents a state of the system, namely the state in which the events in X have occurred. The configuration structures of [SI were required to satisfy several requirements, due to [22] , ensuring that they could be obtained as the families of finite configurations of event structures, namely 0 all configurations are finite (finztarzness), 0 C contains the empty configuration (rootedness), 0 C is closed under nonempty bounded unions (U,), 0 and for any two distinct events occurring in a configuration there is a subconfiguration containing one but not the other (coznczdence-freeness).
In the present paper a more expressive kind of configuration structure is considered, not bound by these requirements. Many of our results however concern finitary rooted configuration structures. A further generalisation of this model was previously proposed by PINNA & POIGNE [17] . Their event automata are rooted finitary configuration structures together with a transition relation between the configurations. Our configuration structures are, up to isomorphism, the extenszonal Chu spaces of GUPTA & PRATT [11, 10, 201 . It was in their work that the idea arose of using the full generality of such structures in modelling concurrency. It should be noted however that the computational interpretation in [ll, 10, 201 differs slightly from that in [16, 22, 6, 171. Formulae In Section 3 we consider set systems from the point of view of (infinitary) propositional logic: E is now thought of as the set of propositions and C as the set of models. Following PRATT [20] we observe a bijective correspondence between configuration structures and infinitary propositional theories up to logical equivalence. We give a number of results equating the closure of C under certain operations with its axiomatisation by formulae of certain simple forms. Event s t r u c t u r e s The behaviour of event structures is traditionally described in terms of their configurations: the consistent and secured sets of events. In Section 4 we relate this description with one in terms of consistent and left-closed set of events. The later corresponds with a logical view of event structures as propositional theories. A somewhat different logical view was presented in GUNAWARDENA [9] . The precise relations with ours are yet to be investigated.
In Section 4.1 we classify event structures along three lines and discuss the characterisation of the associated classes of configuration structures.
Equivalences A model of computation should have a notion of behaviour, and the possibility of comparing behaviours with respect to suitable equivalence relations. To this end, in Section 2, we equip configuration structures with functions 1 : E -+ Act labelling events with actions, and derive associated asynchronous labelled transition relations. We consider various bisimulation relations, adapted for concurrency, between the resulting labelled transition graphs. Section 4.2 considers several classes of event structures within this framework. Whether previously known classes of event structures are as general as arbitrary configuration structures depends on the notion of equivalence used for the comparison. Theorems 1 and 2 are noteworthy in this respect; they imply that the original event structures of [16] are ST-bisimulation universal.
Petri nets In MESEGUER, MONTANARI & SASSONE [14] , arbitrary (non-safe) Petri nets are unfolded into occurrence nets. Their unfolding generalises the one of [16] and preserves the behaviour of nets under a particular interpretation due to GOLTZ & REISIG [SI. We call this interpretation the individual token interpretation. An alternative way of understanding the behaviour of nets is the collective token interpretation. In the latter view there are nets which cannot be represented by an event structure, let alone by a prime one with binary conflict, or an occurrence net.
In Section 5 we establish a connection between pure nets and configuration structures. Pure nets are nets without self-loops. We 1-unfold pure nets into pure 1-occurrence nets, which generalise the occurrence nets of [16] . These pure 1-occurrence nets are shown to correspond with rooted finitary configuration structures.
Through the translation into configuration structures the equivalence notions on such structures are inherited by pure 1-occurrence nets; we generalise them to all nets. The correspondence between pure 1-occurrence nets and configuration structures preserves tion equivalence). The 1-unfolding preserves any reasonable form of history preserving bisimulation equiualence [5] on nets, thus making any pure net history preserving equivalent to a configuration structure. Moreover, any net is ST-bisimulation equivalent to such a structure (and hence to a prime event structure with binary conflict). In contrast, we find a Petri net not history preserving equivalent (in an appropriate sense) to any configuration structure. the identity of events and configurations (configuru-In future work we would like to connect our models with appropriate versions of higher dimensional automata [19] . One could also consider other equivalence relations appropriate for the study of concurrency, such as those based on notions of multiple observers [HI. In work on event structures WINSKEL and others have employed various notions of morphism [22] ; yet another notion occurs in the category of Chu spaces. It seems likely to be of importance to understand the relation with the present equivalence-based approach.
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The computational interpretation of configuration structures
In order to interpret a configuration structure as a concurrent system, it is necessary to know, not only what are the admissible states, but also how the system can evolve from one state to the other.
Definition 1
Let ( E , C) be a configuration structure. Here X --+ Y indicates that the represented system can go from state X to state Y by concurrently performing a number of events (namely the ones in Y -X ) .
The first requirement is unavoidable. The second one represents our assumption that in a finite time only finitely many events can happen. The last requirement says that a number of events can be performed concurrently, or simultaneously, only if they can be performed in any order. This requirement represents our postulate that different events do not synchronise in any way; they can happen in one step only if they are causally independent. Hence our transition relation --+ and the corresponding computational interpretation of configuration structures could be called asynchronous. It should be noted that other computational interpretations of configuration structures are possible. The one of GUPTA & PRATT [ll, 10, 201 is obtained by dropping the last two requirements in Definition 1. By labelling the events, we may observe transitions:
Definition 2 A labelled configuration structure (over an alphabet Act) is a triple C = ( E , C , l ) with ( E , C ) a configuration structure and 1 : E + Act.
The components of such a structure C are denoted Ec, CC and IC respectively (a convention that also applies to other structures iven as tuples). The labelled tran-
E
Such pictures of configuration structures are somewhat misleading representations, as they suggest a notion of global time, under which at any time the represented system is in one of its states, moving from one state to another by following the transitions. Although this certainly constitutes a valid interpretation, we favour a more truly concurrent view, in which all events can be performed independently, unless the absence of certain configurations indicates otherwise. Under this interpretation, the configurations can be thought of as possible states the system can be in, from the point of view of a possible observer. They are introduced only to indicate (by their absence) the dependencies between events in the represented system.
In particular, in the structure D above, the events d and e are completely independent, and there is no need to assume that they are performed either simultaneously or in a particular order. The "diagonal" in the picture serves merely to remind us of the independence of these events. In terms of higher dimensional automata [19] it indicates that "the square is filled in".
On the other hand, the absence of any "diagonals" in E indicates two distinct linearly ordered computations. In one the event f can only happen after event d, and e in turn has to wait for f ; the other has a causal ordering e < f < d. There is no way to view d and e as independent; if there were, there should be a
If we do not care about the order of events d and e in configuration structure D, we can say that the configuration {d, e} has only one (concurrent) history. The configuration { d , e, f } of structure E has two histories. In order to count these histories formally, we introduce a concept of (monoidal) homotopy between the paths in the graph representations of configuration structures.
Definition 3 A path in a configuration structure C is a non-empty sequence of configurations XoXl . . . X,, such that there is a transition Xi-1 +Xi for i = 1, ..., n. Homotopy is the smallest equivalence on the paths of C such that if a path 7r can be obtained by deleting a configuration from another path p (this not being the first or the last one in p) then T is equivalent to p. A configuration X is reachable if there is a path 0 x 1 . . . X, with X, = X. A history of a configuration is a homotopy class of such paths.
Let R be the operation that deletes all unreachable configurations from configuration structures. The reachable part R(C) of structure C is always finitary and coincidence-free. Under the computational interpretation of Definition 1 this is the only part that matters. But, when possible, we will also take unreachabIe configurations into account in connecting models of concurrency, in order to accommodate computational interpretations such as the one of Gupta and Pratt. 
Equivalence relations
-f is a bijection between X and Y preserving labelling and subconfigurations (an isomorphism) , However, this equivalence makes more distinctions than necessary to capture causality and branching: it distinguishes structures E and F above. Therefore, in the full version, we define history preserving bisimulation equivadence to be a coarser equivalence, also generalising the relation from [ 5 ] , which identifies systems like E and F. Its definition is similar, but with histories playing the ritle of configurations. Even coarser equivalences are step-bisimulation (as above, but without the isomorphisms f ) and interleaving bisimulation equivalence (similar, but using only single-action transitions, in which L is a singleton). Between step and history preserving bisimulation we have ST-bisimulation equivalence [7] , based on a notion of state in which events may have been partly executed.
Definition 5 An ST-configuration is a pair ( S , T )
of configurations with T --+ S. The elements of S are the events that have started, whereas T contains the ones that have terminated. The transition relation between configurations extends to one be-
ST-bisimulation equivalence is now defined as in Definition 4, but using ST-configurations and transitions instead of ordinary ones, and letting the f's be ST-maps.
Process graphs In [4]
rooted finitary configuration structures are represented as labelled transition systems, or process graphs, by taking the configurations as states, the empty configuration as initial state, and the single-action transitions as transitions. In the graph representation of structure D from Example 1 the two a-transitions can be recognised as stemming from the same event (d) because they are opposites in a square. This cannot be said for structure E and certainly not for F. Let -be the least equivalence on single-action transitions such that if
. We say that a configuration structure has recognisable events if the evident map from equivalence classes to events is a bijection. If this is the case, the configuration structure, up to isomorphism, is completely determined by its graph.
L K

Axiomatisation of set systems
In this section we consider set systems C = ( E , C ) from a logical point of view: E is thought of as a collection of propositions and C as the collection of models. Connecting with the computational point of view, we associate with an event the proposition that it has happened. There is an associated theory 9 c of all valid sentences, those holding in all models; these are the laws of C.
To make this precise, we choose a language: infinitary propositional logic with E as the set of propositional variables, and closed under negation and all conjunctions of sets of formulae. A formula q5 is valid in ( E , C ) iff it is true in all elements of C; QC denotes the class of formulae valid in C. Equally, given a class 9 of formulae over a set E , we can define a configuration structure CG = (,!?,AA(@)), where M(9) is the set of models of @, those interpretations making every formula in @ true. We say that @ axiomatises Ca. In particular @c axiomatises C for any set system C.
This point of view is due to Pratt [ll, 201. He noted a natural "conjunctive normal form." For any two subsets X , Y of E , let X + Y abbreviate the "propositional sequent" A X V Y . Then for any ( E , C ) , if @ is the collection of sequents valid in ( E , C ) then ( E , C) = Ca. Thus any configuration structure can be axiomatised by a set of propositional sequents.
We now consider correspondences between axiomatisations by classes of formulae and closure conditions on set systems. First, there is logical interest in Scott sequents where both antecedent and consequent are finite, and also in Tarski sequents where, further, the consequent is a singleton [3, 211.
Proposition 1 A set system ( E , C ) is Scott sequent axiomatisable iff C is closed in the product topology on 2E. It is Tarski sequent axiomatisable iff C is closed under intersections and directed unions.
Next we consider closure conditions that arise naturally when considering configuration structures. We denote closure under non-empty intersections by no, under bounded non-empty intersections by n., under bounded non-empty unions by U. and under di- indicates a sequent with no restriction on the antecedent and whose consequent has at most one element; and (any, ddc) indicates an implication whose antecedent can be any conjunction of propositional let- A minor, but useful, variation, is to restrict to rooted configuration structures (i.e. containing la); then in the last column one changes "any" to "non-empty," and "finite" to "finite and non-empty" on the left of the implications (but not the right).
Event structures
Event structures were introduced by WINSKEL [22] : 
The idea behind the enabling relation is that an event e can happen only if a set X of events enabling e occurred previously; Con consists of the finite sets of events that, potentially, can occur during a single run of the system. Winskel explained the behaviour of event structures by associating with each E a family of configurations S(E), the possible states or runs of the system:
Definition 7
The set S(E)' of (secured) configurations of an event structure E = ( E , Con, I-) consists of those X g E which are 0 consistent every finite subset of Y of X is in Con, e and secured '#e E X . 3eo ,..., e, E X . e, = e A V i 5 n. {eo, ..., e+l) k e,.
Winskel [22] gave an intrinsic characterisation of the configuration structures of event structures. A family of configurations C is of the form S(E) iff C is nonempty and has the properties of finite-completeness, finiteness and coincidence-freeness. Here a family of configurations is finitely-complete iff it is closed under directed unions and bounded unions (or equivalently bounded finite unions); finiteness means that if lWe also write S(E) for the structure (E,S(E)).
an event occurs in a configuration, then it occurs in a finite subconfiguration. The properties of finiteness and closure under directed unions together say that the infinite configurations are precisely the directed unions of the finite ones; let us call this property U+-finitary. Furthermore, the properties of non-emptiness and closure under bounded unions are equivalent to rootedness and closure under nonempty bounded unions (0.). It follows that a set of configurations is the Simage of an event structure iff it is U+-finitary, rooted, U,-closed and coincidence-free. Instead of using all configurations to describe the behaviour of an event structure E, one can just as well restrict attention to the finite ones, Sf(E) (for S(E) can be recovered from Sf(E) by means of closure under directed unions). The corresponding characterisation has already been mentioned in the introduction.
Note that finitariness and coincidence-freeness come for free when considering reachable parts of configuration structures.
We consider yet another interpretation of event structures as configuration structures, namely by using the left-closed configurations. These are the consistent sets of events X that satisfy 'de E X. 3Y X. Y t-e.
We show that the left-closed interpretation of event structures is almost the same as the secured interpretation. In order to rule out a pathological case where this does not hold, we define the irreflexive event structures to be the ones satisfying X I -e + X -{e} I -e.
Note that every event structure E can be transformed into an irreflexive one with the same secured configurations by deleting unwanted enablings X l -e with e E X . Such a transformation preserving the leftclosed configurations L(E) is obtained by adding the missing enablings X -{e} t-e (when X I -e). Thus under both interpretations it is no essential limitation to consider irreflexive event structures only. The following proposition says that for such structures the leftclosed interpretation contains more information than the secured interpretation.
Proposition 2 Let E be an irreflexive event structure. Then Sf(E) = R ( L ( E ) ) .
Under the computational interpretation of Definition 1 any such extra information is irrelevant and L and S can be regarded as equivalent.
With any event structure E = ( E , Con, t-) we also associate the propositional theory
This logical view of event structures corresponds exactly with the left-closed interpretation:
Proposition 3 C+(E) = L(E) for any E.
We have no exact characterisation of the structures of the form L(E); however, a structure is of the form Cf(E) (the finite left-closed configurations of an event structure) iff it is finitary, rooted and U,-closed.
Other brands of event structures
One can classify general event structures along three dimensions: stability, having recognisable events and degree of conflict. A further subclass of synchronisation trees 1151 will also be considered. Yet other classes have been considered in the literature, for example bundle event structures (LANGERAK [12] ) and flow event structures (BOUDOL [2] and Castellani).
Definition 8 E is stable iff X t -~ e , Y FE e and X u Y U {e} E con^ imply X n Y FE e.
Winskel defined the stable event structures in [22] . The causal dependencies between the events in a configuration of such a structure can be given by a partial order. The intrinsic characterisation of the configuration structures of stable event structures consists of the same requirements as above, together with closure under nonempty bounded intersections (stability). Stability is equivalent to an interesting local completion principle: if X Y E C then there is a least Y' in C with X Y' Y.
Say that an event structure has recognisable events iff the associated configuration structure does. We do not possess a particularly pleasing description of those event structures with recognisable events, or of their associated configuration structures. However, we do in the case where they are stable.
Definition 9 E is prime iff for all e in E , e occurs in an S-configuration, and there is a least X with X k e. This is (configuration) equivalent to the original definition in [22] . Prime event structures possess a transitive global causal dependency relation, where e 5 e' iff e EX where X is the least configuration containing e'.
Proposition 4 An event structure is prime iff it is stable and has recognisable events.
The configuration structures associated to prime event structures can be characterised by strengthening stability to the requirement that ( E , C) be prime, meaning that C is closed under non-empty intersections. Primality is equivalent to a global completion princi-
The other dimension of variation is the degree of consistency. We consider one possibility:
Definition 10 E has binary conflict if every X not in Con has a subset not in Con with two elements.
See [ Finally we consider synchronisation trees.
g e n e x structures [22] binary conflict and recognisable events prime [221 prime with binary conflict [16] (synchronisation) buT trees [15] 
The difference between the brands of structures up to equivalence notions
One defines labelled event structures, and their corresponding labelled configuration structures, in the evident way. From here onwards we assume all structures to be labelled. The equivalence relations from Section 2 are inherited by (labelled) irreflexive event structures via L. We now turn to comparing classes of event structures and configuration structures with respect to our "test range" of equivalences. We only state our results; the proofs will appear in the full version of this paper.
Proposition 5 Every configuration structure is interleaving bisimulation equiv. to a synchronisation tree.
Since interleaving bisimulation and synchronisation trees were introduced when considering concurrency as interleaving, this proposition may not be surprising. More of a surprise may be that, as regards STbisimulation, the prime event structures are universal.
Theorem 1 Every configuration structure is STbisimulation equivalent to a prime event structure.
We can reduce yet further, to binary conflict:
Theorem 2 Every (prime) event structure is history preserving bisimulation equivalent to an event structure (resp., prime event structure) with binary conflict.
Putting these together, we see that every configuration structure is ST-bisimulation equivalent to a prime event structure with binary conflict. On the other hand, there is a configuration structure not historypreserving bisimulation equivalent to any event structure. In the terminology of the Section 3, it is the one with three events a,b,c axiomatised by a A b 3 c. 
Petri nets Definition 11
A (labelled) Petri net is a tuple ( S , T , F, K , MO, 1) with a S and T two disjoint sets of places and transitions,
0 F : ( S x T U T x S ) -i N, the flow relation, a K : S -i N U {CO)
M ' ( s ) = M ( s ) + CtETU(t) . ( F ( t , s ) -F ( s , t ) ) 5 K ( s )
If a set U of transitions fires, for every transition t in U and every arc from a place s to t , a token moves along that arc from s to t . These tokens are consumed by the firing, but also new tokens are created, namely one for every outgoing arc oft. These end up in the places at the end of those arcs. If t occurs several times in U , all this happens several times (in parallel) as well.
The firing of U is only possible if there are sufficiently many tokens in the preplaces of U (the ones where the incoming arcs come from) and if by firing U , the capacities of the postplaces (where the outgoing arcs go to) are not exceeded. This is expressed by the two conditions in Definition 12.
Definition 13 A net is said to be without capacities if the range of K is {m} and without arcweights if the range of F is (0,l).
Equivalence relations on nets and the correspondence with set systems There are two different schools of thought in interpreting the causal behaviour of nets, which can be described as the individual and collective token philosophy.2 The following example illustrates their difference.
In this net, the transitions labelled a and b can fire once each. After a has fired, there are two tokens in the middle place. According to the individual token philosophy, it makes a difference which of these tokens is used in firing b. If the token that was there already is used (which must certainly be the case if b happens before the token from a arrives), the transitions a and b are causally independent. If the token that was produced by a is used, b is causally dependent on a. Thus, the net A above has two maximal computations, that can be characterised by the partial orders and a-+ b. According to the collective token philosophy on the other hand, all that is present in the middle place after the occurrence of a is the number 2. The preconditions for b to fire do not change, and consequently b is always causally independent of a.
The individual token approach has been formalised by the notion of a process, described in GOLTZ & REISIG [8] . A causality respecting bisimulation relation based on this approach was proposed by BEST, DEVILLERS, KIEHN & POMELLO [l] under the name fully concurrent bisimulation. It can be regarded as 2The individual token interpretation of ordinary nets has nothing to do with the concept of Petri nets with individual tokens; there the individuality is hardwired into the syntax of nets. a form of history preserving bisimulation with these processes as histories. Below we contribute a form of history preserving bisimulation, and several related equivalences, based on the collective token philosophy. That both philosophies yield incomparable notions of equivalence follows from the following example.
B:
In the collective token philosophy the precondition of b expressed by the place in the middle is redundant, and hence A must be equivalent to B. One often is interested in the behaviour of nets as far as it can be expressed in terms of transition firings. The places etc. are then seen as just a tool in specifying such behaviour. In this view, one of the most discriminating behavioural equivalences we can think of in the collective token framework is the following notion of marking equivalence: Note that marking equivalence preserves all causal information present in the net representation of a concurrent system. Whether two transitions are causally independent is a context-sensitive matter. It varies with the markings enabling them both. In such a marking two transitions are independent iff they can fire in one step. This kind of information is present in the step transition relation 4. The nets A and B are marking equivalent. However, for many purposes marking equivalence is too fine. It distinguishes for instance the nets P and Q below, as well as M and N. It follows that the reachable configurations can equivalently be defined as those multisets of transitions X for which there is a firing sequence MO -% MI 3 . . . % M , with X = Note too that the configuration structure associated to a net is not a configuration structure in the sense of Definition 2. It is a structure in a class that enriches set systems in two ways: first by the use of multisets instead of sets, and second, by the addition of the transition relation. Still we define:
Ui. Reachable configuration equivalence is defined similarly and is strictly coarser than (reachable) marking equivalence: The nets P and Q are (reachable) configuration equivalent. However M and N below are not. The reason is that although in N all transitions have a different identity, even though they have the same label.
Next we will determine which class of nets can be described by means of set systems.
Definition 17 A 1-occurrence net is a net in which every configuration is a set.
This implies that any transition can fire at most once. Were we interested only in the reachable configurations we could equivalently require that in every firing sequence MO 1 , % M , the multisets UI, ..., U, are sets and disjoint.
In general the firing relation --+N of a net N is not determined by the set of configurations of N . The nets S and T have a very different behaviour: in S the actions a and b can be done in parallel, whereas in T U there is mutual exclusion. Yet their configurations are the same: S corresponds to the configuration structure D of Example 1; T corresponds to a similar structure, but without the diagonal ab. Therefore it is not a good idea to equate a 1-occurrence net N with the configuration structure (TN, CN, 1~) . 
It follows that for pure nets the transition relation is completely determined by the associated set of configurations. Thus for every pure 1-occurrence net N , C(N) is a set system.
As a consequence, all equivalence notions that are available for configuration structures are available for pure 1-occurrence nets as well. Two such nets are zequivalent iff the associated configuration structures are. One also has these equivalences for comparing such nets with configuration or event structures.
Moreover, the equivalence notions of Section 2 generalise verbatim to configuration structures enriched with an explicit step transition relation, and hence. apply to arbitrary 1-occurrence nets. Now we can ask whether any 1-occurrence net, possibly with self-loopsl is equivalent to a pure 1-occurrence net, or configuration structure. The net T is history preserving bisimulation equivalent to a pure 1-occurrence net. This does not hold in general: Q Proposition 7 The 1-occurrence net above is not history preserving bisimulation equivalent to a configuration structure. However, every 1-occurrence net is ST-bisimulation equivalent to such a structure.
Below we show that the restriction to 1-occurrence nets is not very crucial; every net can be "unfolded" into a 1-occurrence net without changing its behaviour in any essential way. However, the unfolding cannot be configuration equivalent to the original, as the identity of transitions cannot be preserved.
This tells us that the notion of unfolding preserves the behaviour of nets under both the collective and the individual token interpretation. Corollary 1 For every Petri net there exists an STbisimulation equivalent configuration structure. For every pure net there exists a configuration preserving bisimulation equivalent configuration structure. And for every pure 1-occurrence net NI C ( N ) is a configuration structure.
Thus, every transition is replaced by countably many copies, each of which is connected with its environment (though the flow relation) in exactly the same way as the original. Furthermore, for every such copy U an extra place ( U , *) is created, containing one initial token, and having no incoming arcs and only one outgoing arc, going to U . This place guarantees that U can fire only once. In any reachable marking of the unfolded net, one can see exactly which transitions have fired, namely those transitions U for which the place ( U , * ) is empty. Hence every such marking has only one configuration. Proposition 8 Two nets are configuration equivalent iff their unfoldings are. Moreover, for each of our equivalences x, two 1-occurrence nets are x-equivalent iff their unfoldings are.
The configuration structure associated to a Petri net is always finitary and rooted. The following shows that Corollary 1 has an an inverse: every such configuration structure can be obtkined as the image of a pure 1-occurrence net.
Theorem 3 For every finitary rooted configuration structure there exists it pure 1-occurrence net without capacities or arcweights with the same configurations.
Proposition 8 shows we can define all our equivalences on general nets. Definition 20 Two nets are said to be x-equivalent iff their unfoldings are.
Proposition 8 guarantees that this definition is consistent with the one we had already for 1-occurrence nets. Under this definition a net is configuration preserving bisimulation equivalent with its unfolding, although there is no bijective relation between the configurations. This is because a (trivial) element of choice is introduced by the construction. Proposition 9 Every net is configuration preserving as well as fully concurrent bisimulation equivalent with its unfolding.
Proof: As transitions of the net we take the events of the configuration structure. For every transition we add one place without incoming arcs, and with its only outgoing arc going to that transition. These places make sure that every transition fires only once. Let @ be an axiomatisation of the configuration structure consisting of propositional sequents only. For every sequent X 3 Y with X finite, we introduce a place in the net. This place has outgoing arcs to each of the transitions in X , and incoming arcs from each of the places in Y . Let n be the cardinality of X . As the configuration structure is rooted, n # 0. We finish the construction by putting n -1 initial tokens in the created place.
The place belonging to sequent X =+ Y does not place any restrictions on the firing of the first n -1 transitions in X . However, the last one can only fire after an extra token arrives in the place. This can happen only if one of the transitions in Y fires first. The firing of more transitions in Y has no adverse effects, as each of the transitions in X can fire only once.
Thus this place places the same restriction on the occurrence of events as the corresponding sequent. It follows that the constructed net has exactly the same reachable configurations as the original configuration structure. It even has the same unreachable ones. 0
As a corollary we obtain that every pure net is configuration preserving bisimulation equivalent to a net without capacities or arcweights. Every pure 1-occurrence net is even configuration equivalent to a net without capacities or arcweights.
